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Ansah: Law and Literature

LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE WORK OF ROBERT COVER
Tawia Ansah*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that although Robert Cover seems to
discount the role and the practical efficacy of literary texts within the
context of legal interpretation, Cover’s work nevertheless discloses an
extensive exploration of literature and of literary interpretation to
frame his own legal interpretive practices. This is particularly the case
regarding the development of his theory of law’s violence. The Article
attempts to show that a close reading of Cover’s interpretation of
literary texts in the service of his legal analyses discloses a buried
theme pursuant to the violence of law: the threshold concept, between
law and not-law, of the state of exception. The Article suggests that
this concept is key to understanding Cover’s theory of law’s violence.
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INTRODUCTION
“Among the Romans a poet was called vates . . . a diviner,
foreseer, or prophet . . . .”1
In several of his works, particularly in his last essay, Violence
and the Word,2 Robert M. Cover seems to discount the importance, for
law, of literary interpretation. In that essay, Cover makes two points
that underline the distinction and hierarchy between literary and legal
interpretation. First, he emphasizes the nexus between legal
interpretation and law, particularly law’s violence. He writes, “[l]egal
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death,” followed by,
“[l]egal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence
upon others.”3 He then clarifies: “[n]either legal interpretation nor the
violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one
another.”4 Second, Cover adumbrates the hierarchy between legal and
other interpretive practices, particularly literary interpretation. This
clarification takes place mostly within the essay’s footnotes. Noting
with approval the literary critic Fredric Jameson’s “‘priority of the
political interpretation of literary texts,’”5 Cover notes: “But while
asserting the special place of a political understanding of our social
reality, such views do not in any way claim for literary interpretations
what I am claiming about legal interpretation—that it is part of the
practice of political violence.”6
For Cover, the interpretation of literary texts differs
substantively from the interpretation of legal texts because the former,
unlike the latter, “bear[s] only a remote or incidental relation to the
violence of society.”7 Yet within the body of this and his other works,
Cover extensively relies on a masterful interpretation of literary texts.
1

SIR PHILIP SIDNEY, AN APOLOGY FOR POETRY (Forrest G. Robinson ed., BobbsMerrill 1970) (1580) (emphasis added).
2
ROBERT M. COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203, 203 (1995) (1986).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 210 n.15 (quoting FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS:
NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY SYMBOLIC ACT 17 (1981)).
6
Id.
7
Id.; see also id. at 214 n.20 (“My point here is not that judges do not do the kind of
figurative violence to literary parents that poets do, but that they carry out – in
addition – a far more literal form of violence through their interpretations that poets
do not share.”).
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His work is imbued with literature, and his interpretations of stories,
myths, plays, and other texts frame his theory of law. I will review
three works by Cover where stories and myths elucidate the law’s
project, whereby law is manifest through the judge’s decision.
Through the decision, the law is violently impressed upon the human
body, either physically (torture) or psychologically (constraint, loss of
liberty). I will argue that it is through Cover’s literary interpretation
that we apprehend a mythos underwriting his theory of law’s violence.
That mythos is the story of a “state of exception” 8 as both within and
outside of law’s rule.9 The concept is borrowed from the German
political theologist Carl Schmitt10 and elaborated within the work of
the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. 11 Although Cover does not
specifically theorize the concept of the exception, his theory of law’s
violence is consistent with Agamben’s analysis.
I examine the law-literature nexus within three texts by Cover.
First, his monumental work, Justice Accused,12 second, the
aforementioned essay, Violence and the Word, and third, a short essay
entitled, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order.13
8

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 37 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford 1998) (1995).
The state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two sides of
a single topological process in which what was presupposed as external
(the state of nature) now reappears, as in a Möbius strip or a Leyden jar,
in the inside (as state of exception), and the sovereign power is this very
impossibility of distinguishing between outside and inside, nature and
exception, physis and nomos. The state of exception is thus not so much a
spatiotemporal suspension as a complex topological figure in which not
only the exception and the rule but also the state of nature and law, outside
and inside, pass through one another. It is precisely this topological zone
of indistinction, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of justice, that
we must try to fix under our gaze.

Id.
9
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 29 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. Chicago
Press 2005) (defining state of exception as “a threshold where . . . law is suspended
and obliterated in fact [and] a threshold of undecidability is produced at which factum
and ius fade into each other”).
10
CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chicago Press 2005) (1922).
11
See, e.g., AGAMBEN, supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
12
See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
13
See generally ROBERT M. COVER, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the
Social Order, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
COVER 239 (1995) (1987).
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In the first, Cover frames his analysis of the role of the
American judge when interpreting slave laws before the abolition of
slavery through a literary prism: the story of King Creon in
Sophocles’s Antigone,14 and the story of Captain Vere in Melville’s
Billy Budd.15 In each of these stories, Cover attenuates the role of
literary interpretation, even as his theory of violence depends upon a
particular interpretation of these stories.
In the second work, Violence and the Word, a continuation of
Cover’s interpretation of the judge’s role within the American criminal
justice system, a central character of the work is also the human victim
of law’s violence, “the body in pain.”16 Cover draws upon Elaine
Scarry’s study of that body,17 then situates that body within a series of
stories and myths that elaborate his theory of law’s violence within the
juridical order.
In the third work, Obligation, Cover begins with the originary
stories—of autonomous individuals, of the social contract, of the state
of necessity, of the Western imperial project—that underwrite the
human rights narrative as the source and center of the Western juridical
imaginary.18 He compares this origination narrative to the singular
biblical story of Mount Sinai as the source and center of the Judaic
juridical order.19 In both analyses, Western and Judaic, the origination
story shapes, projects, and constrains the violence and the
disciplinarity, respectively, of the two systems.
I suggest that in all three of these works by Cover, when seen
in light of his literary interpretations, Cover’s legal interpretation
subtends a view of law’s violence as impressed upon a human subject
properly situated both within the rule of law as such, its nomos, as well
as in a region extrinsic to law, what Agamben, a decade after Cover,
will call the “zone of indistinction,” also known as the state of
exception, created by the emergency powers of the state. In a sense,
Cover was a vater, a seer, in the unfolding of his theory of law’s
violence. He had already intimated and, through a literary lens, laid
14

SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 159-204 (David Grene et al. eds., Elizabeth Wyckoff
trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1954) (441 B.C.).
15
See HERMAN MELVILLE, Billy Budd, Sailor, in MELVILLE’S SHORT NOVELS 103
(Dan McCall, ed., Norton, 2002) (1924).
16
COVER, supra note 2, at 203.
17
See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD (1985).
18
COVER, supra note 13, at 239.
19
Id.
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bare what we would later experience as the security state and the
immanence of the exception after 9/11.
I.

JUSTICE ACCUSED

Cover opens Justice Accused with a brief and expressly nontraditional interpretation of Sophocles’s Antigone. He writes:
“Antigone’s star has shown [sic] brightly through the millennia. The
archetype for civil disobedience has claimed a constellation of firstmagnitude emulators. The disobedient—whether Antigone, Luther,
Gandhi, King, or Bonhoeffer—exerts a powerful force upon us . . . .”20
Cover goes on to say how much such figures are celebrated in
literature and history. But the downside of this celebrity swiftly
follows, at least for legal interpretation:
Yet, in a curious way, to focus upon the disobedient and
the process of disobedience is to accept the perspective
of the established order. It is a concession that it is the
man who appeals beyond law that is in need of
explanation. With the sole exception of Nazi atrocities,
the phenomenon of complicity in oppressive legal
systems (oppressive from the actor’s own perspective)
has seldom been studied. Thus, Creon is present only as
a foil for Antigone, not himself the object of the artist’s
study of human character. In Antigone note the curious
one-dimensional character of the King. How he comes
to make his law and at what cost in psychic terms is not
treated at all . . . . Much of the simplicity of Creon lies
in the choice of a tyrant as model for legal system. The
making of law and its applications are wholly confined
to a single will unconstrained by any but the most
personal of considerations such as the feelings and
actions of a son.21
Cover’s interpretation of Melville’s Billy Budd similarly moves away
from the victim/protagonist of the play and focuses on the
prosecutor/protagonist, the judge who interprets the law, in this case
Captain Vere.22 Cover’s interpretation of the novella is continuous
20

COVER, supra note 12, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
22
Id. at 2.
21
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with the theme of his book: An analysis of the role of the American
judge during the antebellum period and his or her internal struggle with
the enforcement of the fugitive slave laws.
The two literary works, with which Cover begins his book,
frame Cover’s analysis of those judges. The works are set side by side.
On the one hand, a literary text that paints a thin picture of the judge
or lawmaker, in the figure of Creon, 23 and on the other, a literary text
that provides a richer portrait in the figure of Captain Vere, who
becomes a model of the American judge. 24 The stories introduce the
main event of the text and, at one register, seem to disappear once their
work as framing devices has been performed. In that sense, the literary
texts seem to highlight both the subsidiarity of literature to legal
interpretation—to our focus on the judges and to Cover himself—and
to register the attenuated stakes involved in the former (literary
analysis) as compared with the latter (legal analysis). Once Cover has
set the frame, he dispenses with the stories.
But the stories raise questions internal to their own unfolding
that don’t disappear entirely even after Cover has moved beyond them.
That is, despite the attempt to cabin the literary stories at the beginning
of this book about law and judges, they nonetheless spill into the text
in interesting ways. In a sense, the stories act as a lens through which
to see the judges as they wrestle with the law at the crossroads where
law and morality intersect. 25 Within each of the two framing stories
there is a figure, dispatched by Cover, who nonetheless sits in our
peripheral vision like a specter, or an actor awaiting their cue. The
fictional figure (Billy Budd or Antigone) sits in relation to a fictional
judge (Captain Vere or Creon), much as the real-life antebellum slaves
were situated in relation to a real one. Cover trains our eye on the latter
dyad, the slave and the judge, and particularly on the judge’s lived
internal struggle between law and morality, and between natural law
and positive law.
We see what the judge sees: a liminal person who, having
escaped from the plantation is now in suspension before the judge’s
decision, neither bonded nor free. The slave is outside the law, but
within law’s rule. Because of the way Cover has framed his legal
analysis of the American judge faced with this liminal figure by
23

Id., at 1. See also SOPHOCLES, supra note 14.
MELVILLE, supra note 15.
25
COVER, supra note 12, at 33 (discussing the rise and fall of natural law theories
and their impact on legislation).
24
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introducing the reader to similarly situated fictional characters, we
cannot help but see, as we read about the judge’s moral and legal
dilemmas, those fictional figures in limine, at the periphery of our
attention. Both Billy Budd and Antigone are threshold characters
residing on the border between law and morality, or more precisely,
between law and not law.
So, we go back to take another look at those characters. First
in Antigone, next in Billy Budd, to see whether they might elucidate
the liminal figure of the slave within Cover’s analysis of the judge and,
through that analysis, Cover’s theory of the law’s projection. We
return to the (literary) frame as the site, in other words, of a threshold
of law.
As Cover suggests, Antigone may well be celebrated as “the
archetype of civil disobedience”26 and Creon may indeed be a “foil for
Antigone” and a “tyrant.”27 But there is something indistinct about the
system against which she rebels: it is both the “established order” and
an arbitrary ban pursuant to a state of necessity. 28 Creon’s ban evinces
the crisis of legitimacy in Thebes following the civil war between
Antigone’s twin brothers Eteocles and Polyneices, both of whom
claimed rulership of Thebes after their father Oedipus’s death, and
both of whom died in battle at the gates of Thebes.29 The war and the
brothers’ deaths do not resolve the issue of sovereign authority. But in
war’s wake, someone must be named as the legitimate heir to
Oedipus’s throne. Their uncle Creon claims the throne and, as if at the
flip of an indifferent, aleatory coin, chooses to honor Eteocles as a hero
and Polyneices as the would-be usurper. Creon’s ban sentences to
death anyone who would honor Polyneices with burial rites.30
The ban can be lifted at the behest of the sovereign. The ban,
by its very indifference, determines sovereignty within the state of
emergency that grips Thebes. Creon lifts the ban toward the end of the
play, albeit too late to save Antigone, his son Haemon and his wife
Eurydice, all of whom die by their own hands.31
26

Id. at 1-2.
Id.
28
Id.
29
SOPHOCLES, supra note 14, at 159.
30
Id.
31
See, e.g., SOPHOCLES, supra note 14, at 96, l. 1105-06. Creon heeds Teiresias and
the Chorus: “How hard, abandonment of my desire./ But I can fight necessity no
more.” Id.
27
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Before the ban, the male citizens of Thebes would have had a
kind of political subjectivity or agency, at least within the ancient
world of the play. However, the women of the play—Antigone, her
sister Ismene, and Eurydice, Creon’s wife—would have had a different
status. According to Agamben, under the Grecian social order, 32
women would not have possessed this element of subjectivity, this
political substance known to the Greeks as bios. Agamben defines bios
as follows:
The Greeks had no single term to express what we mean
by the word “life.” They used two terms that, although
traceable to a common etymological root, are
semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē, which
expressed the simple fact of living common to all living
beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which
indicated the form or way of living proper to an
individual or a group.33
Agamben notes further that, “[i]n the classical world, however, simple
natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, and remains
confined—as merely reproductive life—to the sphere of the oikos,
‘home’ . . . .”34 In this sense, women did not possess bios, only zoē.
Unlike Eurydice, however, Antigone ventured forth within the public
space, perhaps because she was, as the daughter of the king (Oedipus),
an exception to the rule of the oikos. She has more than a reproductive
role; in an earlier play within the trilogy, Oedipus at Colonus,35
Antigone tends to her father, now blinded by his own hand, functioning
as his eyes as he navigates the world. When each member of her family
dies, she performs the funeral rites. 36 As such, Creon’s ban, forcing
her to retreat from her role within the public sphere, but also driving
her out of the city gates to “cross the state’s decree,” 37 complicates her
status. It strips her of what limited bios she possessed, but also invests
her with a new, liminal political subjectivity. At the same time, the
ban returns her to the “established order,” where women are zoē. For
32

AGAMBEN, supra note 8, at 1-2.
Id.
34
Id. at 2.
35
SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS AT COLONUS 77 (David Grene et al. eds., Robert Fitzgerald
trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1954) (441 B.C.).
36
SOPHOCLES, supra note 14, at 189, l. 891 (describing her various public and private
roles).
37
Id. at 190, l. 908 (to bury her brother, Polynieices).
33
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instance, at one point, Creon grows tired of the arguments advanced
by Ismene in Antigone’s defense and, in reference to both sisters,
orders his slaves to “take them in. They must be women now. No
more free running.” Creon here expresses this sense of these two
women, under the ban, as situated within a zone of indistinction,
neither one thing nor another. 38
The ban has disclosed this fluid uncertainty between the polis
and the oikos/zōon, the human and the animal. It is a zone of
indifference39 between the marriage chamber and the tomb,40 the living
and the dead.41 Antigone is the figure of the exception, of subjection
to what Agamben describes as “the very limit of the juridical order.” 42
This, as we enter the world of the American judge and the established
juridical order, is what we see within the corner of our eye, troubling
and unsettling, like the black figure fleeing across the plain and into
the law’s shadowy horizon.
A closer look at Billy Budd suggests a similar configuration of
in-between-ness occurring within the world of the novel. Ostensibly,
as noted, the novel frames Cover’s interpretation of the role of the
American judge. The subject of the novel is the law’s enforcer,
Captain Vere. Cover writes, “Melville’s Captain Vere in Billy Budd is
one of the few examples of an attempt to portray the conflict patterns
of Creon or Creon’s minions in a context more nearly resembling the
choice situations of judges in modern legal systems.”43 Cover then
describes the event that precipitated the crisis in the novel:
Struck dumb by the slanderous charges [made by
Claggart against Billy Budd], Billy strikes out and kills
the mate with a single blow. Captain Vere must instruct
38

Id. at 179, l. 578-79.
AGAMBEN, supra note 9, at 23.
40
SOPHOCLES, supra note 14, at 189, l. 891-92. Antigone says, “O tomb, O marriagechamber, hollowed out/ house that will watch forever, where I go.” Id.
41
Id. at 195, l. 1068. Teiresias says to Creon: “For you’ve confused the upper and
lower worlds. You sent a life to settle in a tomb; you keep up here that which belongs
below/ the corpse unburied, robbed of its release.” Id.
42
AGAMBEN, supra note 9, at 23 (“In truth, the state of exception is neither external
nor internal to the juridical order, and the problem of defining it concerns precisely
a threshold, or a zone of indifference, where inside and outside do not exclude each
other but rather blur with each other. The suspension of the norm does not mean its
abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims not to
be) unrelated to the juridical order.”).
43
COVER, supra note 12, at 2.
39
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a drumhead court on the law of the Mutiny Act as it is
to be applied to Billy Budd–in some most fundamental
sense “innocent,” though the perpetrator of the act of
killing the first mate.44
A central tension of the story is Captain Vere’s acquiescence in
following the law of the King, subject to which Budd is guilty, rather
than the law of nature or his own conscience, under which Budd is in
some originary sense “innocent.” The “scruples” of the judge’s
conscience in enforcing an unjust law, in the case of the slave laws, is
then the subject of Cover’s analysis in Justice Accused.45
Billy Budd is similar to Antigone in that it takes place outside
the polis and is set in a time of crisis: mutinies on various of the navy’s
fleet are rampant, and the war ship sails on the high seas under the
shadow of an “Undeclared War” with France. 46 The story also raises
the question of jurisdiction: whether the law to be applied on board the
war ship, named “HMS Bellipotent,” is maritime law or martial law. 47
As with Antigone, the novel takes place within a legal, moral and
political zone of indistinction.
First, Billy Budd is not really a sailor by training. He is a
merchant fisherman, and in these critical times is drafted onto the
warship. The “welkin-eyed Billy Budd—or Baby Budd,”48 is removed
from a merchant vessel called “The Rights of Man” and “impressed”
into the King’s service on the “Bellipotent,” literally meaning “mighty
in war.”49 He is stripped, therefore, of freedom and of choice: “Billy
made no demur. But, indeed, any demur would have been as idle as
the protest of a goldfinch popped into a cage.” 50 Much like Antigone,
Budd is reduced to zoē and subject merely to the ban. In this ethereal
state of law and/as nature—the blue sky, the goldfinch—he is already
slated for death.51 And like a beast, he will strike out blindly when in
pain.
44

Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
46
See e.g., ALEXANDER DE CONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797-801 (1966).
47
COVER, supra note 12, at 5.
48
MELVILLE, supra note 15, at 103.
49
Id. at 104-05.
50
Id.
51
GIORGIO AGAMBEN, MEANS WITHOUT END: NOTES ON POLITICS 21 (Vincenzo
Binetti & Cesare Casarino trans., 2000) (“When their rights are no longer the rights
45
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Captain Vere knows and sees this. When Budd kills Claggart, Captain
Vere says: “Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must
hang!”52 In short, even before the drumhead trial, the task of
interpreting the Mutiny Act, which originated in a state of exception
during the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to “restrict” martial law 53 and
persisted the zone of indistinction within British imperial law, Budd is
already a dead man. Budd’s later defense for the crime was that he lost
language in the moment: “Could I have used my tongue I would not
have struck him. But he foully lied to my face and in presence of my
Captain, and I had to say something, and I could only say it with a
blow, God help me!”54 But Budd had already been reduced, stripped
of bios, of demurrer, and of language. His blow, much like Antigone’s
compulsion to bury her brother Polyneices despite the ban and
knowing that it will lead to a death sentence, 55 is the only act available
to him. And in the end, the story of Billy Budd, Captain Vere and John
Claggart was recast, within the official reports, as a “crime” of
“extreme depravity”; a knife is involved, Budd is reconfigured as a
foreign “assassin” masquerading as an Englishman, and with his
punishment the established order is restored: “The criminal paid the
penalty of his crime. The promptitude of the punishment has proved
salutary. Nothing amiss is now apprehended aboard H.M.S.
Bellipotent.”56
Although he does not name the juridical space within which the
story takes place as a state of exception, Cover seems sensitive to this
interpretation. He notes the analogy between the legal regime
governing the “Bellipotent” and the antebellum slave laws, outlining
five “aspects” of the legal system’s formal character, as follows:
First, there is explicit recognition of the role character
of the judges…It is a uniform, not nature, that defines
obligation. Second, law is distinguished from both the
transcendent and the personal sources of obligation.
The law is neither nature nor conscience. Third, the law
of the citizen, that is when human beings are truly sacred, in the sense that this term
used to have in the Roman law of the archaic period: doomed to death.”).
52
MELVILLE, supra note 15, at 103.
53
See, e.g., Mutiny Act, 1 W. & M., ch. 5 (1688).
54
MELVILLE, supra note 15, at 103.
55
SOPHOCLES, supra note 14, at 162, l. 86 (Antigone saying to Ismene: “Dear God!
Denounce me. I shall hate you more/if silent, not proclaiming this to all.”).
56
MELVILLE, supra note 15, at 168-69.
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is embodied in a readily identifiable source which
governs transactions and occurrences of the sort under
consideration: here an imperial code of which the
Mutiny Act is a part. Fourth, the will behind the law is
vague, uncertain, but clearly not that of the judges. It is
here “imperial will” which, in (either eighteenth- or)
nineteenth-century terms as applied to England, is not
very easy to describe except through a constitutional
law treatise. But, in any event, it is not the will of Vere
or his three officers. Fifth, a corollary of the fourth
point, the judge is not responsible for the content of the
law but for its straightforward application. 57
Elsewhere, Cover notes that “[w]e know Melville’s predilection to the
ship as microcosm for the social order,” and adds that, “[t]he fugitive
slave was very Budd-like, though he was as black as Billy was
blonde.”58 Furthermore,
[t]he Mutiny Act admitted of none of the usual
defenses, extenuations, or mitigations. If the physical
act was that of the defendant, he was guilty. The
Fugitive Slave Act similarly excluded most customary
sorts of defenses. The alleged fugitive could not even
plead that he was not legally a slave so long as he was
the person alleged to be a fugitive. The drumhead court
was a special and summary proceeding; so was the
fugitive rendition process. In both proceedings the fatal
judgment was carried out immediately. There was no
appeal.59
The ship, then, embodies a zone of indifference between land and sea,
war and peace, soldier and civilian, and between vague, uncertain law
and raw fact. The fugitive slave, like Budd, was zoē.
Billy’s fatal flaw was his innocent dumbness. He struck
because he could not speak. So, under the Fugitive
Slave Acts, the alleged fugitive had no right to speak.
And, as a rule, slaves had no capacity to testify against
their masters or whites, generally. Billy Budd partakes
57

COVER, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. at 5.
59
Id.
58
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of the slave, generalized. He was seized, impressed,
from the ship Rights of Man and taken abroad the
Bellipotent . . . . The Mutiny Act was justified because
of its necessity for the order demanded on a ship in time
of war. So the laws of slavery, often equally harsh and
unbending, were justified as necessary for the social
order in antebellum America. Moreover, the institution
itself was said to have its origin in war. 60
The figure of the slave, like that of the fictional characters in
Cover’s framing narratives, founds and centers Cover’s unfolding
interpretation of the judge’s role and, more to the point, his theory of
the law and its violent application. The movement of the figure from
bios to zoē, to an undecidable and undeclared threshold in between
them within the ban underwrites Cover’s later examinations of law’s
violence. The human body, enmeshed within the framing narratives of
human pain, suffering, and silence, becomes the “Word.”
II.

VIOLENCE AND THE WORD

In Violence and the Word, Cover again turns to the role of the
judge and the judge’s interpretation of the law as an act of violence:
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and
death. This is true in several senses. Legal interpretive
acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence
upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a
text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life . . . . Neither legal
interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be
properly understood apart from one another. 61
Legal interpretation transforms the legal text into a substantive act, an
act that has real effects on human bodies. The logos of law is an
imposition of violence. Once again, Cover turns to stories, to literature
and myths, to narrow the lens and specify the law’s teleology in acts
of violence.

60
61

Id.
COVER, supra note 2, at 203.
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As much as each of the literary characters within the previous
section were “impressed” with the word and transformed from bios to
zoē, Violence and the Word takes a different turn. In Violence, within
Cover’s stories of the victim/accused, we see a further development or
clarification, something like the transmutation from zoē to logos. This
movement takes place in two seemingly contradictory directions. On
the one hand, at the center of the law’s teleological violence is the body
in pain, a body destroyed and silenced, 62 as were Antigone, Budd, and
the fugitive slave. On the other hand, that very silence subtends or
reimagines a “re-membering”63 of the world destroyed in the wake of
law’s inscription. 64 Cover tells the story of Rabbi Akibba’s
martyrdom, which involved the opposite of physical inscription: “With
iron combs they scraped away his skin as he recited Sh’ma Yisrael,
freely accepting the yoke of God’s Kingship.” 65 Cover adds in a
footnote to the story: “The word ‘martyr’ stems from the Greek root
martys, ‘witness,’ and from the Aryan root smer, ‘to remember.’
Martyrdom functions as a re-membering when the martyr, in the act of
witnessing, sacrifices herself on behalf of the normative universe
which is thereby reconstituted, regenerated, or recreated.” 66 Scarry
herself notes this duality of pain. On the one hand, “pain comes
unshareably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and
that which cannot be confirmed.”67 On the other hand, and
notwithstanding this radical and world-destroying unsharability of
pain, Scarry adds that sometimes, even belatedly, pain begets the word:
Though the total number of words may be meager,
though they may be hurled into the air unattached to any
framing sentence, something can be learned from these
verbal fragments not only about pain but about the
human capacity for word-making. To witness the
Id. at 205 (“‘Interpretation’ suggests a social construction of an interpersonal
reality through language. But pain and death have quite other implications. Indeed,
pain and death destroy the world that ‘interpretation’ calls up. That one’s ability to
construct interpersonal realities is destroyed by death is obvious, but in this case,
what is true of death is true of pain also, for pain destroys, among other things,
language itself…”) (citing SCARRY, supra note 17, at 4).
63
Id. at 207 n.9.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 207 (quoting MAZHOR FOR ROSH HASHANAH AND YOM KIPPUR, A PRAYER
BOOK FOR THE DAYS OF AWE 555-57 (J. Harlow ed., 1972)).
66
Id. at 206-07 n.9.
67
SCARRY, supra note 17, at 4.
62
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moment when pain causes a reversion to the prelanguage of cries and groans is to witness the
destruction of language; but conversely, to be present
when a person moves up out of that pre-language and
projects the facts of sentience into speech is almost to
have been permitted to be present at the birth of
language itself.68
Cover makes clear not only that pain and death are at the heart of the
judicial act, but that they should be:
As long as death and pain are part of our political world,
it is essential that they be at the center of the law. The
alternative is truly unacceptable—that they be within
our polity but outside the discipline of the collective
decision rules and the individual efforts to achieve
outcomes through those rules. 69
Cover calls this movement the “domestication of violence,” 70
and because the torture victim frames the idea of law’s destination, this
phrasing carries intimations of the bios and zoē transmutation within
the exception that blurs the lines between polis and oikos.
Cover concludes the essay with the idea that law’s rule is univocal,
unidirectional, creating a “tragic limit” to the common meaning that
can be achieved through (legal) interpretation. He elaborates as
follows:
The perpetrator and victim of organized violence will
undergo achingly disparate significant experiences. For
the perpetrator, the pain and fear are remote, unreal, and
largely unshared. They are, therefore, almost never
made a part of the interpretive artifact, such as the
judicial opinion. On the other hand, for those who
impose the violence the justification is important, real
and carefully cultivated. Conversely, for the victim, the
justification for the violence recedes in reality and
significance in proportion to the overwhelming reality
of the pain and fear that is suffered. 71
68

Id. at 6.
COVER, supra note 2, at 203.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 238.
69
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When viewed through the lens of the exception, however, the sense of
unsharability of pain is indelible but also part of the false narrative of
necessity as a motive for the violence, particularly of torture. 72 It is a
way for power to hide its own vulnerability: the torturer “suffers” by
“having to do” the deed. 73 The torturer, for Scarry, can only act if he
tells a story of his own victimhood:
Every weapon has two ends. In converting the other
person’s pain into his own power, the torturer
experiences the entire occurrence exclusively from the
nonvulnerable end of the weapon. If his attention
begins to slip down the weapon toward the vulnerable
end, if the severed attributes of pain begin to slip back
to their origin in the prisoner’s sentience, their
backward fall can be stopped, they can be lifted out
once more by the presence of the motive [i.e., for
information, under the exigencies of the necessity or the
exception] . . . . Power is cautious. It covers itself. It
bases itself in another’s pain and prevents all
recognition that there is ‘another’ by looped circles that
ensure its own solipsism.74
However, there is no certainty that the subjection of the body
to voiceless sentience and, with it, power’s vindication will prevail, as
Cover’s story of the martyr indicates. Steve Larocca also argues that
“pain is an authoritative and unpredictable ‘semiosomatic’ force:
[p]ain demands signification . . .” Larocca further notes that “pain
seeks to speak to the world, hailing and troubling us, but not in the

72

SCARRY, supra note 17, at 58.
Id. (“The motive for torture is to a large extent the equivalent, though in a different
logical time, of the fictionalized power; that is, one is the falsification of the pain
prior to the pain and one the falsification after the pain. The two together form a
closed loop of attention that ensures the exclusion of the prisoner’s human claim.
Just as the display of the weapon (or agent or cause) makes it possible to lift the
attributes of pain away from the pain, so the display of motive endows agency with
agency, cause with cause, thereby lifting the attributes of pain still further away from
their source. If displaying the weaponry begins to convert the prisoner’s pain into
the torturer’s power, displaying the motive (and the ongoing interrogation means that
it is fairly continually displayed) enables the torturer’s power to be understood in
terms of his own vulnerability and need. A motive is of course only one way of
deflecting the natural reflex of sympathy away from the actual sufferer.”).
74
Id. at 59.
73
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limited language of translucent referentiality.” 75 In short, the body in
pain tells a story: it signifies the solipsistic narrative loop, the zone of
anomie against the grain of law’s ostensible projection as
spatiotemporally transcendent, transparent, and indifferent.
The stories within Violence and the Word, those of the body in
pain, confirm and trouble Cover’s teleological theory of law’s
violence. In the end, speaking of legal interpretation as inextricably
linked to law’s violence, Cover notes that, “[b]etween the idea and the
reality of common meaning falls the shadow of the violence of law.” 76
The shadow signifies the law’s anxiety, a penumbra “where inside and
outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other.” 77
III.

OBLIGATION: A JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE

Stories frame and center Cover’s analysis of law’s projection
in this 1987 essay, Obligation. And like the stories within the previous
sections—literary stories in Justice Accused, and the tales of the body
in pain that are screamed, whispered and silenced in Violence and the
Word—the stories, or rather the originary myths, within this essay also
trouble and haunt Cover’s theory of law and its violence.
Obligation compares the two foundational legal traditions: that
of the “post-enlightenment secular society of the West” with “Judaism
[which] is, itself, a legal culture of great antiquity.”78 Language is
important, Cover notes, and “every legal culture has its fundamental
words.”79 For the Western legal traditions, the word is “rights,” and
for the Judaic legal tradition, it is “‘mitzvah,’ which literally means
commandment but has a general meaning closer to ‘incumbent
obligation.’”80
Cover puts the two words “in a context—the contexts of their
respective myths. For both of us [sic] these words are connected to
75

Clifford van Ommen et al., The Contemporary Making and Unmaking of Elaine
Scarry’s The Body in Pain, 9 SUBJECTIVITY 333, 336-37 (2016) (“Instead of the
appraisal that arises from pain being a matter of brute fact, its phenomenology is
related to its intensity, quality, duration, context, and its meaning to the self-in-pain
and others.”).
76
COVER, supra note 2, at 203.
77
AGAMBEN, supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that a torture victim indicates the zone
“in which the very limit of the juridical order is at issue”).
78
COVER, supra note 13, at 239.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 240.
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fundamental stories and receive their force from those stories as much
as from the denotative meaning of the words themselves.” He
continues:
The story behind the term “rights” is the story of social
contract. The myth postulates free and independent if
highly vulnerable beings who voluntarily trade a
portion of their autonomy for a measure of collective
security. The myth makes the collective arrangement
the product of individual choice and thus secondary to
the individual. “Rights” are the fundamental category
because it is the normative category which most nearly
approximates that which is the source of the legitimacy
of everything else.81
As to mitzvah, he writes:
The basic word of Judaism is obligation or mitzvah. It,
too, is intrinsically bound up in a myth—the myth of
Sinai. Just as the myth of social contract is essentially a
myth of autonomy, so the myth of Sinai is essentially a
myth of heteronomy. Sinai is a collective—indeed, a
corporate—experience. The experience at Sinai is not
chosen. The event gives forth the words which are
commandments . . . .82
The exercise of powers differs between the two systems,
predicated on the stories of their origin and the development through
time of their execution. Indeed, Cover notes that the western rule of
law is violent, whereas the Judaic juridical order might be described as
disciplinary: “Nonetheless, there remains a difference between
wielding a power which draws on but also depends on pre-existing
social solidarity, and, welding one which depends on violence.” 83 The
Judaic system depends upon cohesion, whereas Western law depends
upon coherence: “In a situation in which there is no centralized power
and little in the way of coercive violence, it is critical that the mythic
center of the Law reinforce the bonds of solidarity. Common, mutual,
reciprocal obligation is necessary.” 84 This standard is juxtaposed
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id. at 242.
84
Id.
82
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against the western law: “The jurisprudence of rights, on the other
hand, has gained ascendance in the Western world together with the
rise of the national state with its almost unique mastery of violence
over extensive territories.”85 For its legitimacy, the state must,
amongst other things, “tell a story about the State’s utility or service to
us.”86
The line, and the predicate that authority rests with the
consent’s narrative of individuals to give up some freedom for the
security provided by the collective, is both enfolded by and a check
upon the projection of univocal power seen in the article, Violence and
the Word. But here, see the dual movement between law as outwardlooking and indifferent, and the individual at the threshold between
consent and silence. “There is a sense in which the ideology of rights
has been a useful counter to the centrifugal forces of the western nation
state while the ideology of mitzvoth or obligation has been equally
useful as a counter to the centripetal forces that have beset Judaism
over the centuries.”87 The discourse on human rights, as an originary
myth, as mere telos, awaits interpretation. It awaits its legal inscription
as well as its literary, moral, political substance. Human beings
conceived as bearers of rights are aleatory, awaiting their inscription
as the logos:
Rights, as an organizing principle, are indifferent to the
vanity of varying ends. But mitzvoths because they so
strongly bind and locate the individual must make a
strong claim for the substantive content of that which
they dictate. The system, if its content be vain, can
hardly claim to be a system. The rights system is
indifferent to ends and in its indifference can claim
systemic coherence without making any strong claims
about the fullness or vanity of the ends it permits.88
Once again, we see the story as framing and encompassing the legal
field: myth becomes mythos, fusing the law and the exception: system
as not-system, the force of law as “force-of-law.”89
85

Id. at 243.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 244.
89
AGAMBEN, supra note 9, at 39 (“The state of exception is an anomic space in which
what is at stake is a force of law without law (which should therefore be written:
force-of-law). Such a ‘force-of-law,’ in which potentiality and act are radically
86
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But if the story is “empty,” how can it trouble the juridical order
and act to constrain “the most far-reaching claims of the State?”90
Cover concludes this essay by figuratively fusing the two originary
myths with which he framed the interpretation of the law. Noting that
“Sinai and social contract both have their place,” he adds: “I do believe
and affirm the social contract that grounds those rights. But more to
the point, I also believe that I am commanded—that we are obligated—
to realize those rights.”91
IV.

CONCLUSION

Cover’s literary interpretive practices within his legal
interpretive practices have permitted me to explore the underlying
implications of the stories and myths that populate his work in
developing and clarifying his theory of law’s rule. I have suggested
that Cover’s legal interpretation is on all fours with the elaboration of
Carl Schmitt’s political theory of the state of exception, as developed
and extended by Agamben. This interpretation is particularly the case
when Cover trains his gaze on the victims of law’s violence, actual and
imagined: at the Theban gates, or on the high seas, or within the anomie
between rule and exception, bondage and freedom, physis and logos,
life and death.
Within each of the stories, whether fictional, mythic, legal,
originary, and all too lived within our own time and our own
experience, we see the blurring of the line, the indistinction between
the rule of law and law’s suspension within a state of exception.
Cover’s work shows how the irruption within our time of zoē, signified
by the body in pain, underpins the entire established juridical order. 92
And when he declares in Obligation that it is through a suture of rights
and obligations that the law’s violence might be constrained, perhaps
separated, is certainly something like a mystical element, or rather a fictio by means
of which law seeks to annex anomie itself.”).
90
COVER, supra note 13, at 239.
91
Id. at 248.
92
AGAMBEN, supra note 8, at 3. (“According to Foucault, a society’s ‘threshold of
biological modernity’ is situated at the point at which the species and the individual
as a simple living body become what is at stake in society’s political strategies . . . .
What follows is a kind of bestialization of man achieved through the most
sophisticated political techniques. For the first time in history, the possibilities of
the social sciences are made known, and at once it becomes possible both to protect
life and to authorize a holocaust.”).
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he is also suggesting – “we can use as many good myths in [the
universal struggle for human dignity and equality] as we can find” 93—
that the law needs literature au fond, all the way down to its mythic
foundations. It might be the law stories, then, or stories that become
the law, that will mind the tragic gap, the suspension, between the idea
of law and its reality.

93

COVER, supra note 13, at 239.
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